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ADVANCEMENTS AND THE RIGHT OF RETAINER IN MISSOURI
HAROLD I. ELBERT*
I. INTRODUCTION
Among the problems which confront attorneys, executors and adminis-
trators in administering on the estates of deceased persons are the doctrine
of advancements and the right of retainer. Missouri has two statutes relating
to advancements. They are Sections 468.110 and 468.120, Missouri Revised
Statutes (1949). Section 468.110 reads as follows:
"When any of the children of the intestate shall have received,
in his lifetime, any real or personal estate, by way of advancement,
shall choose to come into partition with the other parceners, such
advancement shall be brought into hotchpot with the estate
descended."
Section 468.120 reads:
"Maintaining, educating or giving money to a child under the
age of majority, without any view to a portion or settlement in life,
shall not be deemed an advancement."'
The Missouri definition of advancements is, in Pilkington v. Wheat, 2
stated as follows:
"An 'advancement' is a free and irrevocable gift by a parent
in his lifetime to his child or a person standing in place of such
child, on account of such child or person's share of the donor's estate
which he will receive under the statute of descent if the parent or
donor die intestate."
The right of retainer doctrine was defined in Thompson v. McCum,$
as follows:
". .. The right of the executor to deduct a debt due the
estate from a legacy given by the will is what is called by many
courts and law-writers the right of retainer, which means that
the executor has the right to retain or hold the legacy which is
in his hands by treating the debt due the estate from the legatee
*Member St. Louis, Missouri Bar. A.B. 1942, LL.B. 1944, University of Okla-
homa, LL.M. 1945, S.J.D. 1953, University of Michigan.
1. The word advancement appears in Mo. REv. STAT. § 468.300 (1949)
which reads: "If such child or children, or their descendants, shall have an equal
proportion of the testator's estate bestowed on them in the testator's lifetime, by
way of advancement, they shall take nothing in virtue of § 468.290." That statute
has reference to those cases in which a child claims to be a pretermitted heir, with
which we are not concerned in this article.
2. 330 Mo. 767, 771, 51 S.W. 2d 42, 44 (1932).
3. 333 Mo. 758, 768, 63 S.W. 2d 41, 45 (1933).
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as assets of the estate, also in his hands, and collected by deducting
same from the legacy ... "
Although the definition from Thompson v. McCune, supra, indicates that
the doctrine applies to testate estates, our courts hold that it also applies to
intestate estates.
The purpose of this article is to discuss the cases in Missouri which
involve the two doctrines and to suggest certain legislative changes which
the writer believes should be adopted.
II. HISTORY
A. Advancements
The doctrine of advancements was unknown to the common law of
England, and first became part of the law of that country, with the possible
exception of certain customs of the City of London and York, upon the
enactment of the statute of distributions of 1670.4 Since the statute of
distributions was enacted subsequent to the fourth year of the reign of
King James I it has been said that it is not to be regarded as part of the
Missouri common law. For that reason the advancement doctrine depends
on statutory provisions for its force and effect as a legal doctrine.
The first advancement statute which is now Section 468.110, Missouri
Revised Statutes (1949), was enacted in its present form in 1822.0 Although
that statute has not been changed, an additional statute which provides that
maintaining, educating or giving money to a child under the age of majority
without any view to a portion or settlement in life shall not be deemed an
advancement,7 was enacted as a result of the decision of our supreme court
in State to thre Use of Collins v. Steprenson."
In that case the court held that where a decedent is survived by both
minor and adult children, and the adults have been reared and educated at
the expense of the decedent during his lifetime, the minor children should
be educated and supported out of his estate after his death and that if at
the closing of the estate more had been spent on the adult children than
the minor children, then on distribution the excess allowed the older
4. Elbert, Advancements I, 51 MicH. L. REV. 665-675 (1953).
5. In re William's Estate, 62 Mo. App. 339 (1895); 22 and 23 Charles II,
Chapter 10; Mo. REv. STAT. § 1.010 (1949).
6. For a history of the Missouri probate code see Maus, History and Intro-
duction to Missouri Probate Law, 25 VERNON'S ANNOTATED MISSOURI STATUTES 327(1952).
7. Mo. REv. STAT. p. 661, § 7 (1855), now Mo. REv. STAT. § 468.120 (1949).
8. 12 Mo. 178 (1848).
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2
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 18, Iss. 3 [1953], Art. 2
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol18/iss3/2
1953] ADVANCEMENTS AND RETAINER 251
children should be charged against them as an advancement. The legisla-
ture was dissatisfied with this decision and enacted the statute, heretofore
mentioned, to nullify it.
B. Rigkt of Retainer
The right of retainer is an equitable doctrine and does not depend on
any legislation for force and effect. It is a creature of the common law and
is based on the proposition that it is without conscience for a legatee or
distributee who is indebted to the decedent to receive anything from the
estate without first paying his indebtedness to the decedent.9
III. ADVANCEMENTS AND RIGHT OF RETAINER DISTINGUISHED
Courts are often confused when called upon to distinguish between ad-
vancements and the right of retainer, and on occasion our courts have not
been free of this fault. For example, in In re Lietnan's Estate0 the question
was whether an executor could on final settlement set off a debt due the
testator from a nephew against the nephew's legacy, and the court in re-
ferring to the matter said:
"It matters not by what name the proceeding is called whether
'retainer', 'advancement', 'set-off' or 'assets in the hands of the
legatee' the practical result is the same and it rests upon wholesome
principles of right and justice, which can be administered in probate
courts, without the aid of a court of conscience ... "
Although in some cases it may not matter whether you call an advance-
ment a case calling for the application of the right of retainer principle or
you call a right of retainer case an advancement, many cases do make a
difference and for that reason the two doctrines must be distinguished. An
advancement is a gift which must be accounted for on the distribution of an
intestate's estate, if the advancee is a child or grandchild of the deceased."
If the gift was more than the distributive share of the child or grandchild he
need not account for the excess. 12
The right of retainer is based on the legal doctrine that an heir or leg-
9. In re Lietman's Estate, 149 Mo. 112, 50 S.W. 307 (1899); Webb v. Fuller,
85 Me. 443, 27 Atl. 346, 22 A.L.R. 177 (1893).
10. 149 Mo. 112, 50 S.W. 307, 309 (1899).11. Pilkington v. Wheat, 330 Mo. 767, 51 S.W. 2d 42 (1932). In the following
cases the court held that the doctrine of advancement was not applicable: Johnson v.
Antrikin, 205 Mo. 244, 103 S.W. 936 (1907) (nieces and nephews); Schaper's Ex'r.
v. Schaper, 158 Mo. 605, 138 S.W. 896 (1911) (widow).
12. Marston v. Lord, 65 N.H. 4, 17 Atl. 980 (1888).
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atee must pay his obligations due the decedent, 3 whether he died testate or
intestate,14 and whether the heir or legatee be a child, grandchild, wife, hus-
band, niece, nephew, parent or other relative of the deceased. 10 If the debt
exceeds the legacy or distributive share of the heir or legatee he can be sued
for the excess,' unless the obligation be barred by limitation or bankruptcy,
in which event he is liable only to the extent of his legacy or distributive
share.17
In instances where the debtor contends that the right of retainer doc-
trine is not applicable because the debt is discharged by bankruptcy or
limitations, the courts hold that the moral obligation to repay is sufficient to
justify the application of the retainer doctrine.,
Under the right of retainer doctrine grandchildren who inherit in lieu
of their parents are not chargeable with a debt of their parents to the de-
cedent, 11 whereas children who inherit as representatives of their parent
must account for advancements made to the latter.20
IV. PERSONS TO WHOM THE DOCTRINES ARE APPLICABLE
A. Advancements
In Missouri the advancement statute provides in part: "When any of
the children of the intestate shall have received an advancement ... ".1
By its very terms the legislation includes those instances in which the ad-
vancee is a child of the advancor. The question is then presented whether
the word "children" as used in the statute includes adopted children, grand-
children, a surviving spouse and collateral relatives.
In this state adopted children are treated as if they were the natural
children of the adoptive parents. Although our courts have never been
13. Thompson v. McCune, 333 Mo. 758, 63 S.W. 2d 41 (1933).
14. In re Lietman's Estate, supra n. 9; Hopkins v. Thompson, 73 Mo. App.
401 (1898).
15. In re Jamison's Estate, 202 S.W. 2d 879 (Mo. 1947) (sister); Johnson v.
Johnson, 352 Mo. 757, 179 S.W. 2d 605 (1944) (child); Wright v. Green 239 Mo.
449, 144 S.W. 437 (1912) (parent); Leach v. Armstrong, 156 S.W. 2d 959 (Mo. App.
1941) (child); In re Lietman's Estate, ;upra n. 9 (nephew); Hopkins v. Thompson,
73 Mo. App. 401 (1898) (parent).
16. Cf. statements in Gorg v. Rutherford, 31 S.W. 2d 585 (Mo. App. 1930).
17. Thompson v. McCune, 333 Mo. 758, 63 S.W. 2d 41 (1933) (limitations);
Leach v. Armstrong, 156 S.W. 2d 959 (Mo. App. 1941) (bankruptcy).
18. See note 17, s.upra.
19. Barnum v. Barnum, 119 Mo. 63, 24 S.W. 780 (1893).
20. In re William's Estate, 62 Mo. App. 339 (1895); dicta, Douglass v.
Hammel, 313 Mo. 514, 28,5 S.W. 433 (1926).
21. Mo Ray. STAT. § 468.110 (1949).
[Vol. 18
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called upon to determine whether they can compel natural children to ac-
count for advancements or whether natural children can compel them to
account for advancements, the writer is of the opinion that the courts of
this state would hold that adopted children are included in the word chil-
dren" as used in the advancement statute. To hold otherwise would defeat
the very purpose of our adoption statutes which are designed to treat
adopted children as if they were natural children.
2
?
Although there has never been an appellate court case in Missouri in
which grandchildren of the advancor tried to compel children of the advancor
to account for advancements, or in which children of the advancor tried to
compel grandchildren of the advancor to account for advancements made to
them, the writer is of the opinion that the court would hold that the word
children in the advancement statute includes grandchildren.
Cases involving this factual situation are not numerous because the
grandchildren can only inherit if their parent, who is the child of the
advancor, predeceases them. Cases from other jurisdictions having statutes
which use the word children hold that the words child or children include
grandchildren. 23 The theory of these decisions is that the statute was de-
signed to preserve equality in the division of an intestate's property among
his children and that to hold that grandchildren who inherit by representa-
tion need not account for advancements would tend to defeat the equality
that the statute sought to preserve. In Pennsylvania where the statute used
the word children the court held that the doctrine is applicable in those in-
stances where a grandchild who received an advancement from a grand-
parent inherits as next of kin.24
In one case the court of appeals held that grandchildren, who inherit
by right of representation, must account for advancements made to their
22. Brock v. Dorman, 339 Mo. 611, 98 S.W. 2d 672 (1936); Oler, Constrwetion
of Private Intruments Where Adopted Children Are Concerned, 43 Mica. L. Ra,.
705, 901 (1945). Cf. In re Furnish s Will, 254 S.W. 2d 645 (Mo. 1953) (en banc)
(In that case it was held that an adopted child cannot inherit as a pretermitted heir
from his natural grandparent. In that connection the court said (l.c. 650):
" ... Generally the change by adoption is one of gain. The new status is a
better one than the former. To grant dual inheritance, the child adopted would be
given the inheritance of a natural child and allowed an additional one. The law
intended to give the child adopted the same rights and advantages of a natural
child as far as possible. It was never intended to give the child of adoption more.'
23. Wolfe v. Galloway, 211 N.C. 361, 190 S.E. 213 (1937); Storey's Appeal,
83 Pa. 89 (1876); Eshelman's Appeal, 1 Leg. Chron, 245 (Pa. 1873). Cf. Alleman
v. Manning, 44 Mo. App. 4 (1891), where a parent intended that money given his
grandchildren should be an advancement to his daughter. Although she knew her
father's intention the daughter did not object. Held, the amount is chargeable
to the daughter as an advancement.
24. Storey's Appeal, supra n. 23.
1953]
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parent. In that case the court construed the word children to in-
clude grandchildren. 25 If the word children includes grandchildren in that
instance, our courts should hold that grandchildren must account for ad-
vancements made to them.
This rule is subject to the limitation that the grandchild's parent must
be dead at the time of the advancement. If the transfer of property is made
by the grandfather to the grandchild prior to the death of the grandchild's
parent the doctrine is not applicable.2 6
A surviving spouse cannot compel children to account for advancements.
In Schafer's Ex'r. v. Schafer,27 the court of appeals held that a widow could
not compel her children to account for advancements made to them by her
husband. She contended that since she was entitled to a child's share of the
estate, she should be entitled to compel them to account for advancements.
The court held that the statute allowing her a child's share was designed to
show the quantity, of estate to which she was entitled and that it did not
indicate that she should take as a child.
The court pointed out that if a widow could compel children to account
for advancements, they could compel her to account and that such a ruling
might prove disasterous to her. The court said (l.c. 898):
"It may be said in passing that if this was to be extended to
the widow when taking a child's part, it might prove very disas-
terous to her, for if it includes the widow, she might herself be re-
quired to bring into hotchpot advancements that she had received
from her husband, which advancements might far exceed the in-
terest she takes as a child."
In Johnson v. Antrikin,28 the supreme court held that the doctrine was
not applicable to collateral relatives of the decedent. The court reached
this result by refusing to extend the word children in the advancement
statute to include collaterals.
B. The Right of Retainer
The cases in this state involving the right of retainer doctrine do not
discuss the parties to whom it is applicable. Cases decided by our courts
25. In re William's Estate, 62 Mo. App. 339 (1895).
26. Corlett v. May, 126 Fla. 506, 171 So. 517 (1936).
27. 158 Mo. App. 605, 138 S.W. 896 (1911).
28. 205 Mo. 244, 103 S.W. 936 (1907).
[Vol. 18
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have applied the doctrine to children,29 parents, 30 nephews 8' and a sister. 2
In all likelihood the doctrine would also be held to apply to a surviving
spouse. 33
The right to set off a debt due against the share of a distributee or
legatee should not depend on the relationship of the debtor to the decedent;
it should apply to any instance where a heir or legatee was indebted to the
decedent at the time of his death.
V. RiEuisIms OF ADVANCEMENTS
So long as the parent lives a voluntary inter vivos transfer from a
parent to a child is not an advancement. It cannot become such until the
parent's death at which time the personal representatives and heirs are first
confronted with the problem. Proof of the transferor's death does not make
all voluntary inter vivos transfers advancements. Before advancements can
be changed certain additional things must be proved.
A. Intent of the Advanwor
The Missouri cases when called upon to determine the nature of an
alleged voluntary inter vivos transfer state that the intent of the advancor
determines the nature of the transaction and the intent of the advancee is
regarded as immaterial." Although the advancement statute does not say
that the intent of the parent controls, such a conclusion has been reached
because of the belief that a person may dispose of his property as he
pleases. In Alleman v. Manning,35 the reasons for this conclusion are stated
as follows:
... Our statutes recognize no right of inheritance on the part
of the child, as against the will of the parent, but the parent's
estate is subject to the absolute disposition of the parent; hence it
logically results that the question is not, whether the child was
willing to reserve any specific amount which the parent gave to it,
or paid for it, on its behalf as an advancement, but whether the
parent so intended it to be ... when the parent gives property to
the child, he may at the time fix on it what value he pleases as an
advancement, or he may do so by his will .... "
29. Leach v. Armstrong, 156 S.W. 2d 959 (Mo. App. 1941).
30. Wright v. Green, 239 Mo. 449, 144 S.W. 437 (1912); Hopkins v. Thomp-
son, 73 Mo. App. 401 (1898).
31. In re Lietman's Estate, 149 Mo. 112, 50 S.W. 307 (1899).
32. lit re Jamison's Estate, 202 S.W. 2d 879 (Mo. 1947).
33. In re Lietman's Estate, supra n. 31. In this case the court cites several
English cases where the doctrine was applied to a surviving spouse.
34. 44 Mo. App. 4 (1891).
35. 44 Mo. App. 4, 8 (1891).
19531
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This conclusion can also be justified by a consideration of the advance-
ment statutes. Section 468.110 of the Missouri Revised Statutes (1949) does
not define advancements but states that children to be entitled to a share
of their parent's estate must account for them, and Section 468.120 states
that maintaining, educating or giving money to a child under the age of
majority without any view to a portion or settlement in life is not an ad-
vancement. Therefore, since under one section of the statute the advancor's
intent determines that certain transactions are not advancements, the legis-
lature must have intended for the question of advancements to depend on
the advancor's intent.36
B. Acceptance
From our previous discussion we have seen that the intent of the alleged
advancee is regarded as immaterial. Since the intent of the advancee is
regarded as immaterial, he need not accept the property as an advancement.
In other words, if the parent intended the property to be charged as an
advancement, and the child accepts it, there is a sufficient acceptance. Such
a rule, although consistent with the rule that an advancement depends on
the advancor's intent, may lead to unjust results. For example, a child may
accept property as a gift which he would not accept as an advancement. In
many instances the parent does not express his intention to the child and
therefore the child may be misled. The justification for the rule is that the
child is charged with knowledge that if he accepts property without ascer-
taining his parent's intention he may be accepting it as a part portion and,
therfore, he takes the risk if he fails to ascertain his parent's intention.
In Alleman v. Manning,'" a parent sold certain land and the purchaser
at the parent's request executed five notes for $200 each, one note payable
to one of his daughters and the other notes payable to her four children.
On the parent's death intestate the other children contended that the daugh-
ter should be charged with the four notes given her children as an ad-
vancement, because the evidence showed that the parent intended it to be
an advancement to the daughter and she knew his intention. Held, the notes
given to the daughter's children were advancements to the daughter.
Since the daughter did not request the parent to give the notes to her
four children, the case at first blush seems to be erroneous. However, since
the daughter permitted her parent to give the notes to her children knowing
36. Cf. Woolery v. Woolery, 29 Ind. 249 (1868).
37. 44 Mo. App. 4 (1891).
[Vol IS
8
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 18, Iss. 3 [1953], Art. 2
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol18/iss3/2
ADVANCEMENTS AND RETAINER
that he intended her to be charged with the value of the notes as an ad-
vancement, she must, because of her failure to object, be deemed to have as-
sented to the transaction as an advancement.
C. Intestacy of the Advancor
Before the advancement doctrine is applicable the person making the
transfer must die intestate. If he leaves a will which disposes of any part of
his property, then the advancement doctrine is not applicable.38 The justi-
fication for this conclusion may be found in the language of Section 468.110
which reads in part as follows: ". . . any of the children of the intestate
should have received. . . ." Since the statute uses the word intestate, the
legislature must be deemed to have intended to make the legislation appli-
cable only in those instances where the purported advancor dies totally in-
testate 9 Another justification is that by making a will the parent decided
that he did not desire his children to share equally in his estate.40
In Turpinr v. Turp in,41 the court expressed the reasons for the rule in
the following language:
"The doctrine of bringing advancements into hotchpot applies
only to cases of intestacy... And this is often said to be the rule
where there is a surplus undisposed of by the will. . . . In this
state the matter is covered by statute and the statute only applies
to children of persons dying intestate. . . . Other provisions are
made as to children not named or provided for in the will. ... Here
the children are all provided for in the will one is by the will
charged with an advancement, the others are not, though two were
advanced before the date of the codicil ..
"The will must control. .. ."
In our previous discussion we have assumed that the purported ad-
vancor left a will which took effect on his death. Suppose a purported ad-
vancor makes a will and revokes it before his death and dies intestate. Al-
though there are no Missouri cases involving this problem, the writer is of
the opinion that under such circumstances the doctrine of advancements is
applicable. Such a conclusion is based on the use of the word intestate in
38. Diebold v. Diebold, 235 Mo. App. 83 141 S.W. 2d 119 (1940); Graham v.
Karr, 331 Mo. 1157, 55 S.W. 2d 995 (1932) Turpm v. Turpin, 88 Mo. 337(1885);
In re Reichelt's Estate, 179 S.W. 2d 119 (Mo. App. 1944); Wicldiffe v. Wickliffe,
206 Mo. App. 42, 226 S.W. 1035 (1920); In re Lear's Estate, 146 Mo. App. 642,
124 S.W. 592 (1910).
39. Turpin v. Turpin, supra n. 38 Cowper v. Scott, 3 P. Wins. 119, 24 Eng.
Rep. 993 (1731); Walton v. Walton, 14 es. Jr. 318, 33 Eng. Rep. 543 (1807).
40. Cases, note 38, supra.
41. 88 Mo. 337, 340-341 (1885).
1953)
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the advancement statute. In Hartwell v. Rice,42 the Massachusetts court
justified a like result on the assertion that if the making of a will indicates
an intent to extinguish the advancement, then revocation indicates a change
of purpose.
D. Applicability of the Doctrine of Advancements to a
Preterimitted Child
Section 468.290, Missouri Revised Statutes (1949), provides that a child
not named or provided for in his parent's will shall receive a child's share as if
his parent had died intestate, unless the child was provided for in his
parent's lifetime or unless it appears that the omission was intentional.
In Gibson v. Johnrson,4 3 certain pretermitted grandchildren contended
that the other children of the testator, who were the legatees and distribu-
tees named in his will, should be compelled to account for advancements
received by them from the testator. Held, the children were not required
to account for advancements. The decision of the court was based on the
language of the statute which requires the children to elect to "come into
partition with the other parceners." The court pointed out that title to an
estate by coparcency is always by descent and the persons who had received
advancements had taken title by devise and that the advancement statute
did not apply to devisees.
If the reasoning of Gibson v. Johnson, supra, is carried to its logical
conclusion the children, who take under the will, cannot compel the preter-
mitted child to account for advancements. However, Section 468.300 pro-
vides that if a pretermitted child shall have an equal proportion of the
testator's property by way of advancement, he shall take nothing by virtue
of the pretermitted heir statute. In the writer's opinion this statute should
make the principle of Gibson v. Johnson, supra, inapplicable because the
legislative intent is designed to limit the rights of a pretermitted heir. There-
fore, if he received an advancement in the testator's lifetime, which is not
an "equal proportion of the'testator's property," it should be taken into con-
sideration in determining his rights as a pretermitted heir.
VI. REQUISITE OF THE RIGHT OF RETAINER
The right of retainer doctrine is designed to collect any indebtedness
that an heir or devisee owes the intestate or testator. Whereas an advance-
42. 67 Mass. (1 Gray) 587 (1854). If the will is invalid or inoperative, the
doctrine of advancement is applicable. In re Ford, 2 Ch. 605 (1902); Cf. Prichard
v. Prichard, 91 W. Va. 398, 113 S.E. 256 (1922).
43. 331 Mo. 1198, 56 S.W. 2d 783, 88 A.L.R. 369 (1932).
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ment is a gift and principles of gifts are applicable thereto, the right of re-
tainer is based on a legal obligation owed by the heir or devisee to the in-
testate or testator. Although in some instances the legal obligation may be
discharged by bankruptcy or limitations, the moral obligation to repay,
which remains, is deemed sufficient to make the doctrine applicable. How-
ever, before the doctrine is applicable the executor, administrator, heirs or
devisees must establish a legal obligation owed by the heir or devisee to their
decedent. The following cases are clearly illustrative of this principle.
In Barnett v. Kemp," the administrator of an intestate's estate sued
her son for an accounting alleging that the son had collected money for the
intestate, which was many times the amount he expended for her support
and maintenance. The court held that the son need not account in the fol-
lowing language:
"... If she chose to give her income or more to her son in
exchange for a. home and the companionship of those endeared to
her by . . . ties of blood, a court of conscience, whose decrees
should be tempered by sentiment as well as a wholesome. sense
of right, should not interfere with her choice .... -45
In In re Janisotes Estatee the executors of an estate on partial dis-
tribution sought to charge a claimed indebtedness against the distributive
share of a sister of testator. The evidence showed that testator opened a
brokerage account at Paul Brown and Company in his sister's name and he
guaranteed it. The evidence showed that he told his sister that he would
take the loss and she would have the profit. His executors were compelled
to pay out certain sums by virtue of said guaranty agreement. Held, that
in view of the circumstances the estate could not charge the indebtedness
against the distributive share of the sister.
In Jolnson v. Johsot,47 it was claimed that certain notes barred by
limitations could by right of retainer be set off against a son's share of his
father's estate. The father and son had, after the statute of limitations had
run, compromised the indebtedness for $5,500. Held, the compromise was
valid and the indebtedness could not be set off against the son's share of
the estate. In ruling on the matter the court stated its reasons in the fol-
lowing language (Z.c. 609):
44. 258 Mo. 139, 167 S.W. 546, 52 A.L.R. (N.S.) 1185 (1914).
45. 167 S.W. at 552. Haid v. Prendiville, 292 Mo. 552, 238 S.W. 452 (1922).
46. 202 S.W. 2d 879 (Mo. 1947).
47. 352 Mo. 787, 179 S.W. 2d 605 (1944).
19531
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"The notes were therefore barred by limitation . . . and res-
pondent could make a valid compromise thereon.... But since the
deceased father has made a valid compromise settlement of the
outlawed notes before his death, they would no longer be obliga-
tions due the estate. For the statute of limitations was bind-
-ing on him when he made it...."
Although the legal obligation has been destroyed by such things as
limitations and bankruptcy, the courts hold that the moral obligation to
repay remains and that the only thing that was destroyed was the remedy.
Therefore, the executor or administrator can take credit on final settlement
of the decedents estate for the indebtedness, even though it is barred by
limitations or bankruptcy.4 8
In a number of cases the decedent was surety on an obligation of one of
his heirs or devisees, and his administrator or executor was compelled to pay
a claim based on the suretyship obligation. Because the decedent was not
compelled to pay out the money in his lifetime, creditors of the heirs or
devisees have claimed that the right of retainer is applicable only to an
indebtedness incurred in the decedent's lifetime. Since the obligation to
repay the surety, if he was compelled to pay the debt, was incurred in the
decedent's lifetime, the courts of this state hold that the rights of the ad-
ministrator or executor are superior to those of creditors. 4
VII. PROOF OF ADVANCEMENTS
Although the intent of the advancor is said to determine whether or
not a voluntary inter vivos transfer of property is an advancement, the
determination of that intent is often difficult. When the parent's intention is
expressed, the court have no difficulty in giving it effect. 0 However, in a
great number of instances the courts of this state have no expressed intent
of the parent to solve the problem. Under those circumstances the courts
have created a presumption that all substantial voluntary inter vivos
48. Thompson v. McCune, 333 Mo. 758, 63 S.W. 2d 41 (1933) (limitations);
Leach v. Armstrong, 156 S.W. 2d 959 (1941) (bankruptcy); dicta, In re Lietman's
Estate, 149 Mo. 112, 50 S.W. 307 (1899).
49. Hopkins v. Thompson, 73 Mo. App. 401 (1898). Cf. Old v. Heibel, 352
Mo. 511, 178 S.W. 2d 351 (1944) (In that case one Heibel was named executor of
testator's estate and was a devisee of certain real estate. Before the death of testator
an investment company had obtained a judgment against Heibel and it claimed
that its rights were superior to the right of the estate to subject land devised
to Heibel to a claim for misappropriation of funds while serving as executor. Held,
the lien of the investment company was superior to the claim of the estate).
50. This rule contemplates that intent be expressed at the time the advance.
ment is made and not thereafter. Nelson v. Nelson, 90 Mo. 460, 2 S.W. 413 (1886);
McDonald v. McDonald, 86 Mo. App. 122 (1900).
[Vol. 18
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transfers are prima facie advancements5 and the burden of proof is on the
child to prove that an absolute gift was intended.5 2
The courts base this presumption on the assumption that a parent de-
sires all of his children to share equally in all things they receive from
him, whether received in his lifetime or from his estate at his death.
5 3
Before a transfer of property is presumed to be an advancement, the
person seeking to show advancement must prove that the transfer was a gift.
Once that is proved the presumption of advancement arises and the pur-
ported advancee must prove that an absolute gift rather than an advance-
ment was intended.34
Step ens v. Smitk, 5 is illustrative of the rule. In that case certain
children sought to charge intestate's daughter with an advancement, The
evidence showed that intestate lived with her daughter for 15 months prior
to her death and that during that time she gave the daughter a check for
$300. The court held that the $300 could not be charged as an advancement,
because the presumption of advancement is based on proof of a gift and
where the proof is that she received it and the evidence does not show the
capacity in which the property was received, the presumption is not appli-
cable. The court thought that to hold otherwise would require a presump-
tion to be based on a presumption which is not proper under Missouri law.
In Lynchr v. C'ulver,56 intestate transferred land to three of his six
children by deeds that recited a consideration which the grantees admitted
was never paid. In ruling on the case the court pointed out that ordinarily
a deed reciting a consideration is prima facie a sale and that the burden is on
the person seeking to prove an advancement to rebut the presumption of
sale,57 but where the grantees admit that the transfer was without consider-
51. Lynch v. Culver, 260 Mo. 295, 168 S.W. 1138; Gunn v. Thruston, 130
Mo. 339, 32 S.W. 654 (1895); Pitts v. Metzger, 195 Mo. App. 677, 187 S.W. 610(1916).
52. Gobel v. Kitchen, 217 Mo. App. 354, 266 S.W. 992 (1924).
53. Miller v. Richardson, 85 S.W. 2d 41 (Mo. 1935).
54. Ray v. Loper, 65 Mo. 470 (1877); Gobel v. Kitchen, 217 Mo. App. 354,
266 S.W. 992 (1924); Pitts v. Metzger, 195 Mo. App. 677, 187 S.W. 610 (1916).
55. 127 Mo. App. 18, 106 S.W. 533 (1907).
56. 260 Mo. 495, 168 S.W. 1138 (1914) (One of the advancees contended
that his father deeded the property to him because he was a good boy, and that,
therefore, he should not be charged with an advancement. Held, the fact that it was
deeded to him because he was a good boy is as consistent with an advancement
as a gift and therefore the evidence was insufficient to rebut the presumption);
Lisles v. Huffman, 88 Mo. App. 143 (1901).
57. Pilkington v. Wheat, 330 Mo. 767, 51 S.W. 2d 42 (1932) (The deed
recited a consideration and the other children claimed it had not been paid and,
therefore, the value of the real estate should be treated as an advancement. Held,
the evidence was insufficient to rebut the presumption of sale). Dobbins v.
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ation, the presumption is one of advancement and the burden is on them to
prove an absolute gift.
The mere showing of a voluntary inter vivos transfer does not of neces-
sity make a prima facie case of advancements. In many instances the size
of the transfer may be sufficient to rebut the presumption. Often the fact
that the property transferred is small rebuts the presumption because an
advancement is said to be made with a view towards establishing a child in
life. In McDonsald v. McDonald," the court pointed out that the surround-
ing circumstances and the wealth of the parent must be taken into consider-
ation in determining whether the transfer is so small that the presumption
of advancement is rebutted. For example, an automobile given to a child
by a wealthy parent may be so small as not to give rise to the presumption
of advancement, 51 whereas a gift of a team of horses by a poor farmer to
one of his sons may give rise to the presumption. 0
If the parent at the time of the transfer refers to it as a gift, the child
on the former's death may contend that the reference to the transfer as a
gift means that the parent intended an absolute gift and not an advance-
ment. Although such contention has been made on a number of occasions,
the courts of this state have always held that the use of the word gift is as
consistent with the intent to make an advancement as a gift because an ad-
vancement is a gift and that showing that the parent used the word gift does
not rebut the presumption of advancement.6 '
Humphreys, 171 Mo. 198, 70 S.W. 815 (1902) (The evidence showed that the
consideration recited in the deed had never been paid. Held, the presumption of
sale was rebutted and the transaction was an advancement). Cf. Yates v. Burt,
161 Mo. App. 267, 143 S.W. 73 (1912), where a testator charged advancements to
his children by will. He charged one daughter with $1500 as an advancement in
the will and thereafter deeded her property at a stated consideration of $1600, which
was not paid. The daughter claimed it was a gift and the other children claimed
it was a sale. Held, parol evidence is not admissible to prove it was a gift because
the conveyance was for a good consideration-blood and affection-and that it should
be treated as a sale and the daughter's share of the estate should be charged with
that amount. The parol evidence point made by the court in this case is not
followed in other Missouri cases.
58. 86 Mo. App. 122 (1900).
59. Cf. Dent v. Foy, 206 Ala. 454, 90 So. 317 (1921), 210 Ala. 475, 98 So. 390(1923).
60. Cf. Ison v. Ison, 5 Rich. Eq. 15 (S.C. 1852).
61. Miller v. Richardson, 85 S.W. 2d 41 (Mo. 1935). In determining whether
a voluntary inter vivos transfer of property was a gift or advancement many evi-
dence points have arisen of which the following are illustrative: In Gunn v. Thrus-
ton, 130 Mo. 339, 32 S.W. 654 (1895) the court held that a child could not testify
to her dealings with the intestate to show that a transaction was a gift or
advancement, because of the Dead Man's Statute, but that she could testify as to
transaction between the parent and other children; that declarations of the intestate
made after the transfer of property are admissible to prove that an absolute gift
[Vol. 18
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If a parent transfers property to a child for an inadequate consideration,
the difference between the price actually paid and the fair market value at
the time of the transfer is presumed to, be an advancement. 62
Often a child performs services for a parent or remains on the farm of
his father after becoming of age and renders valuable services. In instances
where the parent has given such a child property, he on settlement of the
latter's estate will contend that it is not an advancement because given him
in satisfaction of a moral obligation. The courts hold that the proof of such
services prior to the conveyance is sufficient to rebut the presumption of
advancement, because the parent was morally obligated to the child and
was repaying that obligation,63
In State to the Use of Colits v. Stephensc," the court held that edu-
cating a child was an advancement. To annul the effect of that decision Sec-
tion 468.120 of the Revised Statu~tes was enacted. That statute provides
that: "Maintaining, educating or giving money to a child under the age of
majority, without any view to a portion or settlement in life, shall not be
deemed an advancement."6s
Since its enactment the courts have not been called upon to construe
Section 468.120. Several problems may arise from support, maintenance and
education of children over the age of majority and in those instances where
a child is the recipient of a college education.
Although the statute is restricted to those instances where money is
advanced for the support and maintenance of a minor child, the court should,
in view of the statute, hold that money spent for the support and mainte-
nance of a child over the age of majority is prima facie an advancement.
and not an advancement was intended and that a child can show absolute gifts that
the intestate made to other children as evidence that the transaction was an
absolute gift and not an advancement. In McDonald v. McDonald, 86 Mo. App.
122 (1900) the court held that a writing charging an advancement which was not
made contemporaneously with the voluntary inter vivos transfer was not admissible
to prove advancements. By way of dicta the court said that a statement by the
intestate that it was an advancement is admissible, if made contemporaneously with
the voluntary inter vivos transfer, as part of the res gestae, but that such statement
is not admissible if made after the transaction and not in the presence of the pur-
ported advancee because it is self serving, and a statement by the intestate that it
was not an advancement which is made after the transaction is admissible as
a declaration against interest. In Ray v. Loper, 65 Mo. 470 (1877) a statement
made by the intestate, after the voluntary inter vivos transfer, to a third person,
in the presence of the purported advancee, that the transfer was intended as an
advancment was held admissible.
62. Mumford v. Mumford 194 S.W. 898 (Mo. App. 1917).
63. Ibid.; Lisles v. Hoffman, 88 Mo. App. 143 (1901); Waddell v. Waddell, 87
Mo. App. 216 (1901).
64. 12 Mo. 178 (1848).
65. Mo. REv. STAT. § 7, p. 661 (1855).
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However, the Colorado courts under an almost identical statute hold that
money expended for the support and maintenance of an adult child is prima
facie not an advancement.08
In states which have been called upon to pass on the problem a college
education has been held not to be an advancement. 7 However, the English
courts hold that such an education is given with a view toward a start in
life and is an advancement. 8 Our courts have not passed on this problem,
but should, in view of the statute, hold that money expended for a college
education before the child becomes of age is prima facie not an advance-
ment and money expended after he becomes of age is prima facie an advance-
ment.
VIII. PROVISIONS IN WILLS CHARGING ADVANCEMENTS
OR DEBTS AGAINST LEGATEES' DISTRIBUTIV SHARES
A parent who dies testate by his will converts all advancements to abso-
lute gifts, unless his will specifically charges advancements. If advancements
are charged by will, it controls and the doctrine of advancements is not ap-
plicable in its technical sense.
In Hanssen v'. Karbe, testator in his will stated that all loans and in-
terest thereon should be treated as advancements because he wanted his
children to share equally in his estate. In discussing this provision of the
will the court pointed out that (L.c. 118):
"Our Missouri statutes requiring advancements to be brought
into hotchpot ... apply only to estates of intestates and have no
application where there is a will containing a direction to
the executor or trustee to treat a debt as an advancement in such
plain, simple and unambiguous terms as apply in this case .... "
The existence of a will does not defeat the right of retainer doctrine un-
less the will forgives the indebtedness.70 By use of a will a person can do
many things that he could not do pursuant to the advancement statute, and
the same is true in instances where the right of retainer is involved. 1
66. Page v. Elwell, 81 Colo. 73, 253 Pac. 1059 (1927).67. Hill's Guardian v. Hill, 122 Ky. 681, 92 S.W. 924 (1906); Bradsher v.
Cannady, 76 N.C. 445 (1877); Miller's Appeal, 40 Pa. (4 Wright) 57 (1861).
68. Taylor v. Taylor, L. R. 20 Eq. 155 (1875).
69. 115 S.W. 2d 109 (Mo. App. 1938).
70. Ibid.
71. Ibid. In that case the will provided that all loans and interest thereon
should be treated as advancements. Plaintiff in spite of the provision sought toforeclose on a deed of trust which was security for a note given to the testator by
a son. The reason for this action was that if the transaction was an advancement
the son had received more than his portion of the estate, if a debt the executor could
collect the entire amount and distribute to the son on final settlement a smaller
amount as his share of the estate. Held, the will converted the debt to an advance-
ment and the executor would not be entitled to commissions thereon. In re Reichelt's
Estate, 179 S.W. 2d 119 (1944). 16
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A study of the cases shows the results that have been accomplished in
this state by the use of a will, which could not have been accomplished if the
person died intestate.
In Nelson v. Wyan,72 a testator in charging advancements to his chil-
dren did not state that they were to bear interest. The court held that the
amounts charged against the share of the children should not bear interest.
However, in In Re Lea's Estate,7 3 the will which charged advancements
provided that interest should be charged thereon and the court in construing
the will charged interest.
In In Re Lear's Estate,74 one son claimed that the amount charged as
an advancement was an error made by the scrivener of his father's will. The
court held that the amount of the advancement charged in the will con-
trolled. Under that decision a testator can charge a child with an absolute
gift as an advancement and he can determine the amount thereof.
In Gartk v. Garth,75 a testator charged part of a debt of a deceased son
against a legacy of the son's child. If he had not charged part of the debt
by will, the court would have held that the right of retainer doctrine was not
applicable."M
In Vitt v. Vitt, T7 a testator converted debts to gifts, and in Strode
Adm'r. v. Beall s and Hanssen v. Karbe,.7 a testator converted debts to
advancements.
By use of a will advancements can be charged to parties not covered by
the doctrine, such as a surviving spouse or collateral relatives, 0 and absolute
gifts can be converted to advancements.8"
In Hanssen v. Karbe,s2 the court of appeals said:
"In fact, we think an advancement set out in the will is a
much preferable way to create advancements than those methods
usually applicable to intestates. In the latter class, the circum-
stances under which a parent bestows a gift on a child is to be
analyzed and testimony given in respect thereto in order to deter-
mine whether it is or is not an advancement."
72. 21 Mo. 347 (1855).
73. 146 Mo. App. 642, 124 S.W. 592 (1910).
74. Ibid.
75. 139 Mo. 456, 41 S.W. 238 (1897).
76. Barnum v. Barnum, 119 Mo. 63, 24 S.W. 780 (1893).
77. 66 Mo. A p p. 214 (1896).
78. 105 Mo. App. 495, 79 -S.W. 1018 (1904).
79. 115 S.W. 2d 109 (Mo. App. 1938).
80. Talbott's Ex'r. v. Goetz, 286 Ky. 504, 151 S.W. 2d 369 (1941); In re
Bressler's Estate, 155 Mich, 567, 119 N. W. 1104 (1909).
81. Albrecht v. Fisher, 14 Ohio App. 195 (1921).
82. 115 S.W. 2d 109, 118 (Mo. App. 1938).
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The quotation from Hanssen v. Karbe is a logical one and advance-
ments should be charged by will if possible. However, the solution is not as
easy as that case indicates because the courts, in instances whtre the will
does not specifically cover the problem, decide cases by analogy to the
doctrine in its technical sense.83
Language in a will which charged children with advancements made to
them in general terms does not solve any problems, and the court must still
decide whether a voluntary inter vivos transfer is a gift or advancement."'
For that reason the testator should specify what transfers are advancements,
and he should place a value thereon. Likewise, in charging a debt against
the share of a legatee, a testator should use specific language. Otherwise,
if the debt exceeds the legacy, his intention may be defeated because the
executor could collect the excess, or there may be a dispute as to whether
the transaction was a debt or advancement, because if the will charges debts
and not advancements, a child need not account if the transaction was an
advancement."
A will speaks from the date of the testator's death and if advancements
are made subsequent to the will, the testator should execute a codicil. If he
fails to do so, those advancements will not be charged to the child, unless
the will requires the child to account for all advancements rather ,than
specific ones."6
IX. ACcOUNTING FOR ADVANCEMENTS
A. The Hotchpot Doctrine
Section 468.110, Missouri Revised Statutes (1949), reads in part as
follows: "When any of the children of the intestate shall . . . choose to
come into partition with the other parceners, such advancement shall be
brought into hotchpot. .. ." The word "hotchpot" comes from the common
law rule of requiring the donees of gifts in frankmarriage to return the
property received by them before participating in the distribution of dece-
dent's estate. Under the common law hotchpot doctrine, the donee in frank-
83. Nelson v. Wyan, 21 Mo. 347 (1855).
84. Yates v. Burt, 161 Mo. App. 267, 143 S.W. 73 (1912).
85. Hanssen v. Karbe, 115 S.W. 2d 109 (Mo. App. 1938).
86. Graham v. Karr, 331 Mo. 1157, 55 S.W. 2d 995 (1935); Wickliffe v.Wickliffe, 206 Mo. App. 42, 226 S.W. 1035 (1920); Turpin v. Turpin, 88 Mo. 337(188s).
[Vol. 18
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marriage had to elect to return the identical property received by her.t In
Ray v. Loper0,8s hotchpot is defined as follows:
"Bringing into hotchpot, under our statute, does not mean
that the property or money advanced shall, in kind or specie, be
thrown in with the property which has descended, but that it be
estimated and charged against the party according to its value
at the time the advancement was made ......
Since the identical property is not returned and since the property is
valued at the date of the transfer rather than on the date of intestate's
death o° the word hotchpot as used in the statute has a different meaning
from the one it had at common law. Therefore, in the writer's opinion the
word should not be used in the advancement statute.
In In Re St. Vrime's Estate,0 the court of appeals said that the advancee
must elect to come into hotchpot and that if he refused he was barred from
participation in the estate. In Ladd v. Stepkens,91 the supreme court said
that a child had a right to a judicial determination of whether a voluntary
inter vivos transfer was a gift or advancement, before being required to
make an election.
Although both In Re St. Vrian's Estate and Ladd v. Stephens state
what should be the technical rule in Missouri, they do not represent the pre-
vailing view in this state. As will hereinafter appear, the child is charged
with advancements on final settlement of the decedent's estate, or in a parti-
tion decree, whether he elects to participate in the division of the estate or
not. The election rule is not proper in this state because the child does not
return any property to the estate nor does he account for any excess if he re-
ceived more by way of advancement than his distributive share. For that
reason he should always elect to participate in the estate.
87. Law v. Smith, 2 R. I. 244 (1852). In 1 COKI'S FIRST INsTITUTES 721,
Coke defines hotchpot as follows: "And it seemeth that this word (hotchpot) is in
English a pudding; for in this pudding is not commonly put one thing alone, but
one thing with other things together. And therefore it behooveth in this case to
put the lands given in frankmarriage with the other lands in hotchpot, if the hus-
band and wife will have any part of the other lands," In 2 BL. COMM. *190, Black-
stone in discussing hotchpot said: ". . . By this housewifely metaphor our ancestors
meant to inform us, that the lands, both those given in frankmarriage and those
descending in fee simple should be mixed and blended together, and then divided
in equal portions among the daughters. But this was left to the choice of the
donee in frankmarriage and if she did not choose to put her lands into hotchpot,
she was presumed to be sufficiently provided for, and the rest of the inheritance
was divided among her other sisters. . .
88. 65 Mo. 470, 472 (1877).
89. Elliott v. Wilson, 98 Mo. 379, 11 S.W. 739 (1889).
90. 1 Mo. App. 294 (1876).
91. 147 Mo. 319, 48 S.W. 915 (1898).
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B. Property to be Accounted for
The Missouri statute provides that if any child who has received an ad-
vancement in real or personal property shall choose to come into "partition
with the other parceners such advancement shall be brought into hotchpot
with the estate descended." In an early case the court of appeals held that
because the statute used the word parceners only advancements in real estate
need be accounted for, and that an advancement in real property could not
be charged on final settlement against the advancee's share in the personal
estate.9 Subsequently, that case was reversed by the supreme court, and the
Missouri rule is that all property given as an advancement, whether it be
real or personal, must be accounted for. That case also holds that on dis-
tribution of the personal estate, advancements in real estate can be set off
against the distributee's share of the personal estate.93 Likewise, a child can
be charged with an advancement of personal property in an action involv-
ing partition of the intestate's real estate.94
C. Determining Distributive Shares Where Advance-
-nents Are Involved
An administrator or executor when called upon to charge an advance-
ment or debt in final settlement must determine how he is going to take the
debt or advancement into account in determining the share of each child.
In Pitts v. Metzger,3 the intestate estate to be distributed was $15,000
and intestate had made a $1,500 advancement to daughter A and a $1,300
advancement to daughter B. The court pointed out that the two advance-
ments were to be added to the $15,000, making a total estate of $17,800 to
be divided among the intestate's five children. The $17,800 is then divided
by 5, which means that each child was entitled to $3,560, but since daughter
A received $1,500 as an advancement, her share is diminished by that amount
and daughter B's share is diminished by the $1,300 she received as an ad-
vancement. Therefore three of the children received $3,560, daughter A
received $2,060 and daughter B received $2,260. The same method is fol-
lowed in right of retainer cases.
D. An Advancee Need Not Account For the Excess When He
Has Received More Than His Distributive Share of The Estate
A child may receive more by way of advancement than he is entitled
to on the distribution of the parent's estate. Under such circumstances, the
92. Elliott's Estate v. Wilson, 27 Mo. App. 218 (1887).
93. Elliott v. Wilson, 98 Mo. 379, 11 S.W. 739 (1889).
94. Cf. Pilkington v. Wheat, 330 Mo. 767, 51 S.W. 2d 42 (1932).
95. 195 Mo. App. 677, 187 S.W. 610 (1916).
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administrator or other heirs cannot compel the child to refund the excess
received by him. Although the Missouri courts have not been compelled to
pass on the problem, the courts would reach that result because an advance-
ment is a form of gift, rather than a debt.96
In those instances where the heir or devisee is indebted to the estate in
an amount exceeding his distributive share, the executor or administrator
can sue the heir or devisee and recover the balance. If the debt is barred by
bankruptcy or limitations, an executor or administrator is not entitled to
recover more than the distributive share of the heir or devisees. The reason
for the rule is that recovery of the excess can only be had in a suit at law
in which the defense of bankruptcy or limitations would be a bar. Recovery
can only be had in a partition suit or on final settlement and in those in-
stances the limit of the recovery is the distributive share of the heir or
devisee.
E. Liability of Grandchildren for Advancements Or
Debts Of Their Parents
The advancement statute of Missouri requires children to account for
advancements. In many instances a child predeceases his parent, and on the
latter's death the other children contend that grandchildren should account
for an advancement. If the court followed a strict interpretation of the stat-
ute, grandchildren would not have to account for an advancement made to
their parents. But in In Re William's Estate,97 the court construed the word
96. Cf. Hanssen v. Karbe 115 S.W. 2d 109 (1938); Nelson v. Wyan, 21 Mo.
347 (1855).
97. 62 Mo. App. 339 (1895); dicta, Douglass v. Hammel, 313 Mo. 514, 285
S.W. 433 (1926). Cf. Diebold v. Diebold, 235 Mo. App. 83, 141 S.W. 2d 119 (1940),
where a testator by his will charged as advancements any notes he had paid for
his son's or son's-in-law with 6% simple interest. The will provided that the children
of a deceased daughter should inherit her share. Testator held a note of the
deceased daughter. Held, the note of the son-in-law was chargeable against the
share of the children of the deceased daughter.
The authors of the Model Probate Code .(Model Probate Code, § 29) take
the position that grandchildren who inherit from their grandparents per capita
should be charged with advancements made to their parents. This position is
contrary to the decided cases. Brown v. Taylor, 62 Ind. 295 (1878); Skinner v.
Wynne, 55 N.C. (2 Jones Eq.) 41 (1854). The rule as disclosed by the decisions
of the courts is, in the writer's opinion, preferable to the provision of the Model
Probate Code. The purpose of advancement statutes is to preserve equality among
the children of the advancor. If he is survived by two children and the children
of a deceased child who received an advancement, equality can only be preserved
by charging the children of the deceased child with the value of the advancement.
Advancement statutes are not designed to produce equality among grandchildren
and consequently advancements made to their parents should not be charged to
them when they inherit per capita.
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child as including grandchild so that a grandchild who inherited by right of
representation must account for advancements made to his parent.
In instances where a child who is indebted to a parent predeceases the
latter and is survived by children who inherit from their grandparent, the
other children cannot have the debt charged as part of the grandchild's
distributive share.98
X. PROCEDURE
Once the other children or administrator determine that a transaction
is to be charged as an advancement or that a debt due the estate by an heir
or distributee must be collected, the question is presented as to what pro-
cedure must be followed to charge the advancement or recover the debt.
Advancements are chargeable in two ways, (1) by taking credit for the
advancement on final settlement of the intestate's estate,09 and (2) by
charging advancements in a partition suit.100 These procedures are not
alternatives. If advancements are to be charged, they must be charged at
the earliest opportunity. If advancements are not charged on the final settle-
ment of the personal estate, they cannot thereafter be taken into consider-
ation in a partition suit.101
The purported advancee can challenge the charge of advancements by
filing exceptions to the final settlement or by denying the advancement in
the partition suit.102
In cases involving the right of retainer the executor or administrator can
recover the debt by instituting suit in the appropriate court or by setting off
the debt on final settlement. In Gorg v. Rutherford,os the rule is stated
as follows:
"A demand of this character, due an estate from a distributee,
may either be collected by the administrator bringing an independ-
ent action thereon in a court having jurisdiction thereof, or the ad-
ministrator may deduct the amount of the demand from the heir's
distributive share, whereupon the probate court may either approve
or disapprove of the act of the administrator, and make a final
order of distribution, from which the party aggrieved may prosecute
his appeal. .. ."
98. Barnum v. Barum, 119 Mo. 63, 24 S.W. 780 (1893).
99. Nelson v. Nelson, 90 Mo. 460, 2 S.W. 413 (1886).
100. Pilkington v. Wheat, 330 Mo. 767, 51 S.W. 2d 42 (1932).
101. Gorg v. Rutherford, 31 S.W. 2d 585 (Mo. App. 1930).
102. Nelson v. Nelson, .spra n. 99.
103. 31 S.W. 2d 585, 588 (1930). If the administrator or executor sues and
recovers the debt he would be entitled to commissions, whereas if he sets it off on
final settlement he would not be entitled to commissions. Hanssen v. Karbe, 115
S.W. 2d 109 (Mo. App. 1938).
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In those instances where the defense to the obligation is limitations or
bankruptcy, the executor or administrator must set off the debt on final
settlement. If he files suit on the debt the defense would be good, because
the indebtedness may exceed the debtor's distributive share and there is
no way to apportion the amount which can be recovered from the amount
which cannot be recovered.
XI. PRIORITIES
A. Advatcewnnts
The Missouri courts have never been called upon to determine what
rights creditors of the advancor have to set aside advancements, nor have
the courts of this state been called upon to determine whether a third person
who purchased the advancee's interest in the advancor's estate takes subject
to the advancement or whether he takes free and clear of the advancement.
However, decisions from other states are very helpful in determining
these questions. The advancee in those states acquires the same title as the
advancor.10 Because an advancement is a form of gift, it is said to have
been made without consideration insofar as existing creditors are concerned.
Therefore, if a transfer of property by a parent to a child renders the parent
insolvent or if he was insolvent before the transfer, it is void as to existing
creditors.10o
A child cannot defeat the doctrine of advancements by selling his in-
terest in the estate to a third person, whether the third person is aware of
the advancement or not.'06 Likewise, a purchaser from an heir stands in
the latter's position and can compel children other than the one from whom
he purchased an interest in the estate to account for advancements.117
B. Riglht of Retainer
An heir, distributee or legatee who is indebted to the decedent is often
indebted to other persons who claim that their debts take priority over the
104. Cf. Cox v. A. P. Green Fire Brick Co., 230 Mo. App. 774, 75 S.W. 2d 621(1934).
105. Creed v. Lancaster Bank, 1 Ohio St. 1 (1852); Hamilton v. Bradley, 6
Tenn. (5 Hayw.) 127 (1818) Cf. Higham v. Vanosdal, 125 Ind. 74,25- N.E. 140(1890), where a parent purchased property for his son, without an agreement that
the son should pay for it. Thereafter a suit was instituted against the son, who while
the suit was pending, ostensibly to secure the purchase price of the land, executed
a mortgage to the father. Held, the mortgage was void as to the son's creditors.
106. Russell v. Smith, 115 Iowa 261, 88 N.W. 361 (1901); Corbett v. Wright,
120 Va. 471, 91 S.E. 612 (1917).
107. Nicholson v. Caress, 59 Ind. 39 (1877).
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claim of the estate, especially where the estate seeks to set off the indebted-
ness against real estate. In all instances the courts hold that the decedent's
estate takes priority over the claims of other creditors.108
In Trader's Bank v. Dennis Estate,10 9 plaintiff claimed that a note held
by it which was secured by deed of trust took priority over the claim of
the estate of a decedent, from whom plaintiff's debtor had inherited the
property. The note and deed of trust were executed prior to the death of
decedent, and decedent before his death was surety on an obligation for the
debtor which his administrator- was compelled to pay. Since the deed of
trust took effect at intestates death and the suretyship obligation was not
paid until later, plaintiff claimed that its deed of trust was prior to the
claim of the administrator. The administrator claimed that the real estate
descended to the debtor subject to his right of set off. Held, that the claim
of the administrator was prior to that of the holder of the deed of trust.
In Studer v. Harlan,,'0 a partition suit, the purchasers of the interest
of one of testatrix's children claimed that debts due from their vendor to the
testatrix should be first taken from the child's interest in the personal estate,
and if the debts exceeded the interest in the personal estate then they should
be deducted from the real estate. Held, that debts should be deducted first
from the personal estate and if they exceed the personal estate then they
should be deducted from the real estate. The court also pointed out that
the partition suit should under the circumstances be held in abeyance until
it was determined whether the child's interest in the personal estate was
sufficient to pay the debts he owed testatrix.
A conveyance by one child of a decedent to the other children of his in-
terest in the decedent's estate is not fraudulent as to his creditors if he is
indebted to the estate in a sum exceeding his interest in the estate. The
reason for the rule is that creditors are not prejudiced by the conveyance
because the child did not have anything coming from the estate."' In
108. Hopkins v. Thompson, 73 Mo. App. 401 (1898). Cf. Wright v. Green,
239 Mo. 449, 144 S.W. 437 (1912). In that case the father of intestate was one
of her heirs at law and was indebted to the estate in the sum of $136. The father
was adjudicated a bankrupt and his interest in intestates real estate was sold at
bankruptcy auction sale. The purchaser of the property at bankruptcy sale offered
to buy the indebtedness to the estate, but his tender was refused. Held, the
indebtedness did not divest the father of title and payment of the debt would
leave the interest free and clear, and therefore payment of the debt by the purchaser
at the bankruptcy sale divested the estate of any claim against the father's interest.
109. 221 S.W. 796 (Mo. App. 1920).
110. 109 S.W. 2d 687 (Mo. App. 1937).
111. Trabue v. Henderson, 180 Mo. 616, 79 S.W. 451 (1904).
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Duffey v. Duffey,112 a child who was indebted to the intestate claimed that
he was entitled to an exemption as the head of a family which must be al-
lowed to him before the right of retainer was applicable. Held, where the
estate is setting off a debt by virtue of the right of retainer doctrine, the
child is not entitled to the statutory deductions as the head of a family.
In Ford v. O'Donnell,', one Miles O'Donnell assigned his interest in
his father's estate to defendant for value. Thereafter, the administrator of
his father's estate sued Miles and obtained a judgment. Before obtaining
judgment, he notified defendant of the existence of the proceeding. There-
after, in this proceeding the judgments were held not admissible and de-
fendant was permitted to relitigate the issue of Miles' indebtedness. That
case suggests that the best procedure for setting off a debt against the pur-
chaser of a child's interest in the estate is to deduct the indebtedness on final
settlement, rather than obtaining a judgment against the child.114
XII. VALUATION AND INTEREST
A parent may give a child property in his lifetime which is worth
$5,000 and at the parent's death the property may be worth much more or
much less than that amount. Likewise, a child may receive an advancement
many years before his parent's death and the other children may insist that
he account for interest or if the child is indebted to the parent, the question
of interest may arise when the right of retainer is brought into play.
The Missouri statutes do not provide for the valuing of advancements.
However, the cases hold that advancements are to be valued when made,
because the advancement is made at the risk of the child receiving it and,
therefore, he should be entitled to any gain.115
The Missouri cases state that the advancor can at the time of the trans-
fer place a value on the property and that value will control." 6 That state-
ment which is made in two decisions of our courts can lead to disasterous
results if carried to its logical conclusion. In Ray v. Loper,217 the first case
112. 155 Mo. 144, 55 S.W. 1002 (1900).
113. 40 Mo. App. 51 (1890).
114. A reading of Ford v. O'Donnell, 40 Mo. App. 51 (1890) may mislead
the reader because that case referred to a previous case between the parties in
which the St. Louis Court of Appeals held that the probate court did not havejurisdiction to determine the validity of the debt. However, this line of cases was
overruled by Elliott v. Nelson, 98 Mo. 379, 11 S.W. 739 (1889). Cf. Gorg v.,
Rutherford, 31 S.W..585 (Mo. App. 1930).
115. Ladd v. Stephens, 147 Mo. 319, 48 S.W. 916 (1898); Ray v. Loper, 65 Mo.
470 (1877). Cf. Nelson v. Wyan, 21 Mo. 347 (1855).
116. Ladd v. Stephens, supra n. 115; Ray v. Loper, supra n. 115.
117. 65 Mo. 470 (1877).
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making that statement, and in which it was dictum, the question was whether
a transaction was a gift or advancement. In the other case, Ladd v.
Stephens,11s the parent had, when he gave the property to the child, placed
a value on it which was known to the child.
Ray v. Loper and Ladd v. Stephens must be limited in effect to those
instances where the amount of the advancement is made known to the child.
If the value is not made known to the child, he is deemed to have accepted
it at its actual value, and the advancor's valuation cannot control. If the
parent in placing a value on the advancement was seeking to reduce the
value to an, amount which is less than the value at the time of the advance-
ment, he can do so without the advancee's assent, because his actions are
beneficial to the advancee and acceptance is presumed.',
Interest is not chargeable on advancements in Missouri, because an
advancement is a gift.
In Nelson v. Wyan,12° the supreme court in discussing whether interest
is chargeable on advancements said:
"The rule is that advancements do not bear interest .... It
would work gross injustice to make them do so. A parent advances
to a child a thousand dollars; twenty years after, he advances to
another child, who was then unborn; now, this rule of making ad-
vancements bear interest would require the parent, in order to
equalize his bounty, to give to the child last advanced, as our rate
of interest is now, ten per cent, three thousand dollars. He must
have his thousand dollars by way of advancement, and his twenty
years' interest thereon, making two thousand dollars more, in order
to make him equal with the child first advanced. An advancement
is at the risk of the child advanced, from the time it is made. If
it is lost, or is destroyed, or perishes it is at the risk of the child ad-
vanced. It is his loss, and he is chargeable with the value of it,
at the time the advancement is made, and with no more. So, if the
property or money advanced is increased-if it becomes more val-
uable; or the child would not have been credited by it had it per-
ished, so he shall not be chargeable with any profits it may make.
... These advancements are gifts; they are not debts which are dis-
charged...."
Likewise, if a stock pays dividends after the advancement the advancee
need not account for them.121
118. 147 Mo. 319, 48 S.W. 915 (1898).
119. Cf. Wallace v. Owen, 71 Ga. $44 (1876); Wheeler v. Wheeler's Estate, 47
Vt. 637 (1874).
120. 21 Mo. 347, 352-353.(1855).
121. Ladd v. Stephens, 147 Mo. 319, 48 S.W. 915 (1898).
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Our courts have never been called upon to determine whether -an ad-
vancement bears interest after the death of the advancor and before the
estate is finally settled. Most jurisdictions which have passed on this ques-
tion hold that. interest is chargeable after the death of the advancor,122 but
disagree as to the date that interest commences to run. According to one
view, interest is recoverable from the date of the advancor's death to the
date an order of distribution should be entered.123 Another view is that
interest does not commence until after the expiration of a reasonable time
for the settlement of the estate,124 and a third view is that interest is charge-
able from the date of the advancor's death to the day the order for final
distribution is entered . 22
Where a debt is owed the decedent, and the executor or administrator
seeks to set it off against a distributive share of the estate, it bears interest
to the date of death, if the note provided therefore or if the obligation was
past due. 12
In Stutder v. Harla,127 the St. Louis Court of Appeals stated the in-
terest rule to be applied after death to be as follows:
"The case being one involving the doctrine of equitable re-
tainer, we think that the date of the death of the deceased should
determine this feature of the controversy. The will of the deceased
spoke as of that date, and it was then that Maud Young became
vested with her interest or share in the estate, which consisted, as
we have already pointed out, of her distributive or inherited share
less what she owed the estate. It follows, therefore, that if such
share was equal to or in excess of the amount of her indebtedness,
then no interest should accrue on her note subsequent to the death
of the deceased as of which date the executors are retaining so
much of Maud Young's share as will offset her indebtedness to the
estate. In other words, her indebtedness is discharged, not by ac-
tual payment of the note, but upon the principle of equitable re-
tainer, and it could only be in the event that her indebtedness to
the estate exceeded the amount of her inherited or distributive
share that interest should continue to accrue, and then only upon
so much of the principal of the note as was in excess of the share
vesting in her."
122. Dixon v. Marston, 64 N.H. 433, 14 Ad. 728 (1887); McKelvey v. Burrow,
89 Tenn. 101, 17 S.W. 1035 (1890).
123. Jackson v. Jackson, 25 Tenn. App. 198, 154 S.W. 2d 797 (1939).
124. Tart v. Tart, 154 N.C. 502, 70 S.E. 929 (1911).
125. Wysong v. Rambo, 56 S.W. 1053 (Tenn. Ch. App. 1899).
126. Watts v. Mayes, 232 S.W. 122 (Mo. 1921); Studer v. Harlan, 109 S.W. 2d
687 (Mo. App. 1937).
127. 109 S.W. 2d 687, 691(Mo. App. 1937).
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Although the rule stated in Studer v. Harlan seems to be a logical one,
it does not represent the law in this state. In Watts v. Mayes,128 the supreme
court held that the distributee could avoid interest by paying the debt and
that since the executor had a legal right to sue him rather than charge the




The doctrine of advancements is of statutory origin and first became
part of the Missouri law in 1822, and the statute enacted in that year has
never been changed. The drafters of the statute seemed to think that the
advancement concept was derived from the gift in frankmarrage. 10  For
that reason they worded the statute in part as follows: "When any of the
children of the intestate . . . shall choose to come into partition with the
other parceners, such advancement shall be brought into hotchpot."' 4 0
The language of the statute tends to mislead persons, who have prob-
lems involving it, because of the use of such words as "choose," "partition,"'
"parceners" and "hotchpot." Those words were incorporated in the statute
because the authors believed that the doctrine was derived from the gift in
frankmarriage, which doctrine only applied to real estate and which required
the donee in frankmarriage to return the identical property received to the
estate.,," In this state the doctrine of advancement applies to both real and
personal property.13 2 Although some cases indicate the advancees must elect
to participate in the estate, an election is unnecessary because the property re-
ceived by the advancee is not returned to the estate, but it is charged to the
advancee at its value at the time of the advancement.1aa Also, the advancee is
not required to return the excess if he received more by way of advancement
than his distributive share of the estate.1 34 For those reasons the statute
should be changed to eliminate such words as "choose," "partition," "par-
ceners" and "hotchpot."
The statute uses the word "children" in describing the class of persons
who must account for advancements. By judicial legislation the court has
128. 232 S.W. 122 (Mo. 1921).
129. Law v. Smith, 2 R.I. 244 (1852); 1 COE's FIRST INsTrrTUTEs 721; 2 BL.
COMM. *190.
130. Mo. REV. STAT. § 468.110 (1949).
131. Note 129, swpra.
132. Elliott v. Wilson, 98 Mo. 379, 11 S.W. 739 (1889).
133. Ray v. Loper, 65 Mo. 470 (1877).
134. Note 96, supra. 28
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construed the word "children" to include "grandchildren" in those instances
where advancements were made to a child, who predeceased the intestate,
and was survived by grandchildren. 3 5 Our courts have never decided
whether grandchildren must account for advancements made to them by
the intestate after their parent's death. However, since advancements are
designed to produce equality among children, the courts of this state would
undoubtedly require grandchildren to account for advancements made to
them if they inherit by right of representation. Because a grandparent may
feel that he occupies the relation of parent to a grandchild after his parent's
death the statute should include grandchildren. However, the doctrine
should not be extended to include a surviving spouse or collateral relatives.
Advancement statutes are designed to make such a will for an intestate
as he would in all likelihood have made for himself. Because of our belief
that a man should be permitted to dispose of his property as he pleases, the
courts of this state hold that the intent of the advancor determines whether
a voluntary inter vivos transfer is an advancement or absolute gift.3 In
determining that intention the courts presume that all substantial voluntary
inter vivos transfers are advancements. 8 7 Such a presumption is based upon
the theory that the intestate desires all of his children to share equally in his
estate, including what comes from him in his lifetime, as well as at his
death.188
The presumption is not a logical one because if the intestate intended
for his children to share equally in his estate he would (1) attach conditions
to the voluntary transfer at the time it was made which would show an ad-
vancement was intended, or (2) execute a will charging the voluntary trans-
fer as an advancement. If he does neither of these things the logical assump-
tion is that he did not intend to charge the transfer as an advancement. For
that reason the authors of the Model Probate Code have prepared a provision
of their model advancement statute which reads as follows: "Every gratuitous
inter vivos transfer is deemed to be an absolute gift and not an advancement
unless shown to be an advancement."' 39 In the writer's opinion such a pro-
vision should be incorporated in the Missouri advancement statute, and the
135. I1 re William's Estate, 62 Mo. App. 339 (1895).
136. Allernan v. Manning, 44 Mo. App. 4 (1891).
137. Lynch v. Culver, 260 Mo. 295, 168 S.W. 1138 (1914); Gunn v. Thruston,
130 Mo. 339, 32 S.W. 654 (1895); Pitts v. Metzger, 195 Mo. App. 677, 187 S.W. 610(1916).
138. Miller v. Richardson, 85 S.W. 2d 41 (Mo. 1941).
139. Simes and Basye, Problems in Probate Law, MoDEL PROBATE CODE § 29,
pp. 65-66 (1949).
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provisions of Section 468.120 providing that maintaining, educating or giving
money to a child under the age of majority, without a view to a portion or
settlement in life, shall not be deemed an advancement, should be eliminated.
In the writer's opinion an appropriate advancement statute in Missouri
should read as follows:
(a) If a person dies intestate, real or personal property which
he gave as an advancement in his lifetime to any of his children or
grandchildren, who if the intestate had died at the time of making
the advancement would be entitled to inherit a part of his estate,
shall be counted toward the advancee's intestate share, but the ad-
vancee shall not be compelled to refund any part of such advance-
ment, if it exceeds his distributive share of the estate. Every
gratuitous inter vivos transfer is deemed to be an absolute gift and
not an advancement unless shown to be an advancement.
(b) Advancements shall be valued as of their value at the
time of the voluntary inter vivos transfer, unless the advancee
comes into possession or enjoyment at a later date, and in that
event they shall be valued as of the time the advancee came into
possession or enjoyment or at the death of the intestate, whichever
first occurs.
If advancements are restricted to voluntary inter vivos transfers from
an intestate to a child or grandchild and if the presumption is one of abso-
lute gift rather than advancement, the writer is of the opinion that much
litigation between children and grandchildren of intestates will be avoided.
B. The Righ~t of Retainer
The right of retainer doctrine is designed to simplify the collection of
debts due a testator or intestate from his heirs or devisees. By permitting
the executor or administrator to set off a debt on final settlement of the
estate, the courts relieve him of the necessity of procuring a judgment
against the heir or devise. 140
By use of the doctrine the executor or administrator can also obtain
priority over other creditors of the heir or devisee to the extent of the in-
terest of such heir or devisee in the estate, whether his interest be in real
or personal property. 41 To the extent that the doctrine accomplishes these
results it should be retained in Missouri. However, our courts have ex-
tended the doctrine to permit the administrator or executor to set off debts
barred by bankruptcy or limitations against the share of the heir or leg-
140. Gorg v. Rutherford, 31 S.W. 2d 58S (Mo. App. 1930).
141. Trader's Bank v. Dennis Estate, 221 S.W. 796 (Mo. App. 1920).
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atee.14 2 In the writer's opinion the doctrine should not be used to allow an
executor or administrator to set off an obligation against the share of an
heir or distributee unless he could collect the claimed obligation by an action
in a court of appropriate jurisdiction.
A testator or intestate who permits a debt to be barred by bankruptcy
or limitations could recoup any loss he feels that he has suffered by changing
his will or by dying testate instead of intestate. Since he failed to change
the outlawed obligation by will, the presumption should be that he did not
intend the outlawed obligation to be deducted from the distributive share
of the heir or legatee.
142. Thompson v. McCune, 333 Mo. 758, 63 S.W. 2d 41 (1933) (limitations);
Leach v. Armstrong, 156 S.W. 959 (1941) (bankruptcy).
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